The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer

RAY SUAREZ: Good evening. I'm Ray Suarez. Jim Lehrer is visiting public TV stations and on book tour. On the NewsHour tonight: A summary of the news; Iraq and weapons inspectors make a deal in Vienna; inspectors will talk about how their work is done; West Coast ports are shut down, we'll report on the troubles on the docks; and a new report from the CIA sees big countries in crisis, from HIV and AIDS.

NEWS SUMMARY

RAY SUAREZ: UN and Iraqi officials agreed today on a plan to renew weapons inspections. In Vienna, Austria, the chief UN weapons inspector, Hans Blix, said Iraq accepted "all the rights of inspections," as detailed in past UN resolutions. Another UN official said the agreement did not include so- called "Presidential" sites. Iraq said an advance UN team could arrive in Baghdad in two weeks. Late today in Washington, Secretary of State Colin Powell said the U.S. is opposed to resuming inspections until the Security Council revisits the issue.

COLIN POWELL: We do not believe they should go in until they have new instructions in the form of a new resolution.

RAY SUAREZ: We'll have more on this story in a moment. President Bush today rejected a compromise resolution offered by two foreign-policy authorities in the Senate. Kwame Holman reports.

KWAME HOLMAN: There will be talk of war on the floor of the United States Senate tomorrow. Members are scheduled to begin debate on a resolution authorizing President Bush to take action against Iraq. But at the White House this morning, the President complained the resolution language offered by two prominent Senators is too weak.

PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH: I don't want to get a resolution which ties my hands, a resolution which is weaker than that which was passed out of the Congress in 1998. Congress in 1998 passed a very strong resolution. They wisely recognized that Saddam Hussein is a threat. He was a threat in '98, and he's more of a threat four years later.

KWAME HOLMAN: What the President has proposed is a resolution that would allow him use of military action against the threat posed by Iraq, but also to restore international peace and security in the region. However, many Democrats and some Republicans want to narrow the scope of the resolution. Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden and senior committee Republican Richard Lugar have proposed alternative language that concentrates the authorization for the use of force on Iraq as opposed to the entire region, and focuses the authorization to use force solely on securing the dismantlement of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. This afternoon, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer argued that language is too narrow.

ARI FLEISCHER: It pulls back the... many of the provisions that Congress itself cited in 1998, such as requiring or asking or demanding of Iraq to cease their support for terror, to stop oppression of his own people, to cease threatening his neighbors. Those are three of the specifics that have been in previous contained bipartisan drafts what the Congress passed and also what the United Nations has spoken to and supported that would not be found in the too- narrow Biden-Lugar proposal.

KWAME HOLMAN: Majority Leader Tom Daschle said he hoped the Iraq resolution language can be worked out within the next 24 hours.

SEN. TOM DASCHLE: And if the administration will work with us, I think we can demonstrate a very significant show of strength.

KWAME HOLMAN: A final vote is expected next week.

RAY SUAREZ: The Federal Aviation Administration did not know terror suspects were training as pilots in the U.S. until long after September 11. A congressional investigator said today the warning was in an FBI memo dated July 2001. At a House-Senate hearing, Eleanor Hill said it was just one example of intelligence agencies failing to alert other key agencies to potential dangers.

ELEANOR HILL: While the FAA, the Customs Service, the State Department and I NS each had data concerning the 19 hijackers, that data was not related to their terrorist activities or associations. As a result, none of this information would by itself have aroused suspicions regarding a planned terrorist attack within the United States.

RAY SUAREZ: Also today, the Justice Department inspector general reported the FBI has never done a comprehensive, written assessment of terrorism threats in the U.S. On Wall Street today, bargain hunters drove stock prices up after two days of sell-offs. The Dow Jones Industrial Average gained 346 points, more than 4.5%, to close at 7,938. The NASDAQ was up 41 points, or 3.5%, at 1213. The gains came despite an industry group's report that manufacturing fell in September after seven months of growth. President Bush called today for a quick resolution in a labor dispute that's shut down 29 ports on the West Coast. Shipping lines locked out dock workers Sunday, at facilities that handle about $1 billion a day in goods. Dozens of cargo vessels are waiting to be unloaded, and hundreds of millions of dollars in cargo is sitting dockside. The dispute involves pensions, new technology, and union jurisdiction over new jobs. The spread of AIDS will threaten some of the world's most populous countries over the next decade. In a new report, the CIA warns there could be 75 million cases in Russia, China, India, Ethiopia, and Nigeria by 2010. The report's author says the epidemic could threaten regional, and ultimately, U.S. security. We'll have more on this story later in the program tonight. Publisher and philanthropist Walter Annenberg died today at his home in suburban Philadelphia. He had complications from pneumonia. Annenberg launched "TV Guide" magazine in 1953, and ultimately became one of the richest men in America. He served as ambassador to Britain in the Nixon administration, and endowed two leading communications schools and a host of other causes. Walter Annenberg was 94 years old. That's it for the News Summary tonight. Now it's on to: A deal with Iraq on weapons inspections; and inspectors talk about the methods and the challenges of an Iraqi mission; we'll have a report on the labor troubles on West Coast ports; and look at a new CIA report on the global AIDS crisis.

FOCUS INSPECTING IRAQ

RAY SUAREZ: The deal emerged on the second day of talks at the United Nations in Vienna, aimed at returning weapons inspectors to Iraq for the first time since 1998. Chief UN weapons inspector, Hans Blix, made the announcement at a press conference late in the day.

HANS BLIX: Technical matters are often crucial for the effectiveness of inspections, and thereby their credibility. It is therefore better to have thorough discussions about them in Vienna than in the field. It has been found that many practical arrangements followed between 1991 and 1998 remain viable-- viable and useful-- and could be applied. On the question of access, it was clarified that all sites are subject to immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access. However, the memorandum of understanding of 1998 establishes special procedures for access to eight presidential sites.

We have gone through a very great many practical arrangements, and I know we have tried your patience in waiting for us, but they start by the question of, where do you fly into Baghdad, from where; and then, how are the Customs controls, what can you bring in; the accommodation of inspectors in Baghdad, the premises for our center in Baghdad and the refurbishment; the movement within Iraq, et cetera. We've gone through... no, you can't foresee everything. No. But you can foresee a good deal, and I think we have talked openly about them, and we have gone through what you can at this stage.

REPORTER: A question to the Iraqi, please. Doctor, are you happy with these agreements? When are the weapons inspectors going back? And will they have immediate access to the sensitive sites, please, sir?

AMIR AL-SADI: Yes, we are happy to agree to this agreement. And we expect the advance party to arrive in Baghdad in about two weeks. And we expect no difficulty regarding that. We have come to a very practical arrangement that we would, from our side, anticipate every inspection to sort of go to sensitive sites, and we will take the measures that will cancel the need for a waiting period and getting approvals.

REPORTER: A question to both dr. Blix and Mr. Al-Sadi. The Americans and the British have made it very clear that any sorts of conditions, preconditions, on access to the presidential compounds is simply unacceptable. How are both of you going to get around that?

HANS BLIX: Well, we are not discussing the memorandum of understanding. That is an agreement that exists, has been reached between the secretary-general and Iraq, and it has been endorsed by the Security Council. We are not changing the law that is adopted by the United Nations. The Security Council can take measures, whatever it likes. We are a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, and we will be bound by them, but we are not changing them on our side.

SPOKESMAN: Next question?

AMIR AL-SADI: And I concur with that.

MOHAMMAD AL-BARADI: I might just add, I think that under the existing mandates we have, we have now the assurances from the Iraqi side that we will have unrestricted, uninhibited...

HANS BLIX: Unconditional.

MOHAMMAD AL-BARADI: unconditional access to all sites in Iraq, with the exception of the presidential sites that are covered by the memorandum of understanding between the Security Council and the government of Iraq. And I think that assurance, I think, is very important.

REPORTER: Dr. Al-Sadi, I wonder if you could address the issue of access to presidential sites. You must understand that from certainly the American perspective, that is seen as critical to the success of any future inspections.

AMIR AL-SADI: Quite honestly, I don't understand why it is so critical. Anyway, it was not a subject on the agenda. It was...

REPORTER: So will there be access?

AMIR AL-SADI: It is regulated by a memorandum of understanding, and it is also referred to in the Security Council resolution and that remains valid.

RAY SUAREZ: Now a reaction to the news from Vienna and to Margaret Warner.

MARGARET WARNER: With me is the United Kingdom's ambassador to the United Nations, Sir Jeremy Greenstock.

Welcome back, Mr. Ambassador.

SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Thanks, Margaret.

MARGARET WARNER: Your reaction to the agreement announced today in Vienna?

SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: It's a very good first stage agreement. Hands Blix and his team have done an excellent job in, as Secretary Powell I think called it clearing away the under brush, the technical matters that are necessary for the establishment of the teams in Iraq. And they've done that on the basis that the Security Council resolutions have laid out up to now. So a number of, I hope, fairly straight forward things have been done. The Iraqis know that it's unconditional, unrestricted access that we're talking about. And that's a very good step taken.

MARGARET WARNER: You think this is something you think can be built upon?

SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I don't think that Hans Blix has yet done all he needs to do before his inspection teams go back to Iraq. He's coming back to talk to the Security Council in two days' time. And we will discuss with him what remaining preparations have to be done before he has the instruments in his hand to make sure that Iraq cannot block inspections at any time anywhere or access to anyone relevant to the program. And we'll be going through those final points with him when he comes back.

MARGARET WARNER: So are you and is the British government in agreement with the U.S. Administration that this agreement alone is simply not enough and that it would not be an acceptable set of ground rules for inspectors to return under?

SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Oh, yes, we are in total agreement with the U.S. that thereneeds to be more clarification in the more difficult areas. As Hans Blix has very rightly said, he does not want to go back into Iraq with certain things left unclear or where there may be confrontation. It's for the Security Council to take some further decisions on the full range of instruments in Hans Blix's hands, and then he will need a further discussion with the Iraqis about that.

MARGARET WARNER: Have you canvassed the other three permanent five members of the Security Council on their reaction to this and are they in agreement with the U.S. and Britain that more needs to happen?

SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: We have started discussions in New York that flow from a number of discussions between capitals. So this started a long time ago. We've been in consultation with our closest partners on the Security Council for some time.

MARGARET WARNER: I actually meant this afternoon, though, the reaction to this. Because obviously the Iraqis are essentially saying, okay, we're ready to let you back in and these are the ground rules as far as we're concerned.

SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I think the United States and the United Kingdom are making it very clear, and the other members of the Security Council know this perfectly well, that we need to have no fudge whatsoever in any part of the arrangements for the inspectors that may cause difficulties, which may lead to decisions being taken that we would rather avoid. So absolute clarity in what Hans Blix and his teams can and cannot do still needs to be thrashed out and we need to do that with the concurrence of our partners on the Security Council and they are not yet absolutely clear in their own minds as to what they will agree to. So those discussions are going to continue.

MARGARET WARNER: Now the Presidential sites being in their own special category, were not included in this today. Is it fair to say that that's a nonstarter as far as the U.S. and Britain are concerned having them be in any special category?

SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: The way in which the memorandum on Presidential sites was interpreted is a nonstarter. No territory can be immune. You can hide the kind of weapons that we're talking about underneath any bit of territory in the Presidential sites are huge. So of course the dignity of senior Iraqis will have to be respected in the right way. We're not asking the inspections to be discourteous. But the territory, the sites themselves have got to be open to inspectors, 100% of Iraqi territory has got to be open to inspectors. Otherwise we will get into the kind of fudge and concealment that we had in earlier years, and we're not going back down that route.

MARGARET WARNER: The Iraqis pointed out today, and in fact Hans Blix did also, that this understanding that was reached back in '98 between Kofi Annan and Iraq on the Presidential sites was endorsed by the Security Council in a resolution. Are you seeking to rescind that resolution?

SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I think we're seeking to make it clear that the circumstances have changed, we've got a different inspection team. UNMOVIC is not UNSCOM. The Security Council wants to remain in control of what is now going to happen. And Hans Blix has acknowledged that the Security Council will be giving him his instructions. So the Security Council is in a position to clarify what it wanted out of the inspection process in 1998, which was, we think, distorted by the Iraqis in practice, and to go back to the original concept of 1991, 687 which was immediately accepted by the Iraqis, for full, unconditional, unfettered access, that's what we're going for.

MARGARET WARNER: Now, Colin Powell said just moments ago that as far as the U.S. is concerned -- and I think this is what you're say too -- is that you still want a very toughly worded new resolution that covers a lot of areas, not just the Presidential sites. What is the procedure, however, if you don't get this new resolution within two weeks when Hans Blix said he's ready to go back and the Iraqis are ready to have him come, what happens? In other words, is Blix sort of on autopilot and you'd have to vote or tell him not to go? Or does he need authorization from the Security Council to go?

SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Hans Blix is not on autopilot as he himself has acknowledged. I think that Hans will not want to start his inspection teams deploying if he sees the Security Council is still discussing the basis on which he will be deployed. So I don't believe that he will wish to make that mistake of being unclear about the instruments that he is carrying, both physical and metaphorical, before he goes in. So that is an adjustable time scale.

MARGARET WARNER: So just to make sure I understand, you're saying even if there's disagreement among the permanent five, let's say perhaps the Russians would like to go ahead under these ground rules and the U.S. and Britain wouldn't, that you do not believe Hans Blix would go, that essentially this could be put off until the Security Council comes to an agreement?

SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: I think it's much too difficult for Hans Blix to go if there remains a division between members of the Security Council, whether permanent or nonpermanent. I think he will want to wait until there has been a new decision by the Council, since we're preparing to do that, and he knows that he would be unsafe for him, politically as well as an inspection terms, to go if there was still discussion going on, yes.

MARGARET WARNER: Politically, does this agreement today complicate your efforts to get this toughly worded new resolution that you and the United States have been promoting?

SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Absolutely not. And let's be quite clear about what this toughness means. It's toughness for an inspection regime that is going to work. This is what we're both saying, the U.S. and the UK, we want the inspections to do the job that was not done in previous years. We don't need military action to do the job if the Iraqis cooperate with the inspections to do it before there is any decision of that kind. But it's quite clear from history that it's also necessary that the Iraqis realize that they've got to cooperate, that there's no second chance beyond this last option. So we're steering between the Iraqis not recognizing that the threat of force is real and inspections that are not powerful enough to do the job. And I think that the discussions over the next few days are going to be able to do that.

MARGARET WARNER: And you aren't dismayed or... that's not really the word I'm looking for here, but when the Iraqis said this past weekend that they would not accept any new ground rules.

SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: The Iraqis don't have a say in this. The Security Council is likely to pass a mandatory resolution making it absolutely clear what Hans Blix is empowered to do, and the Iraqis are obliged to accept that. We would much rather they accepted it willingly. But we have to have an arrangement where by there is no territory, no time, no person that is relevant to inspections, that is debarred or delayed for inspection. And that is going to be the product of this resolution.

MARGARETWARNER: Mr. Ambassador, thank you so much.

SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK: Thank you.

RAY SUAREZ: More on sending inspectors back to Iraq, and to Gwen Ifill.

GWEN IFILL: Joining me now for further assessment of today's announcement and whether it increases the likelihood that weapons inspections will return soon are three former inspectors. Charles Duelfer, a visiting scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. He was the deputy executive chairman of UNSCOM, the original U. N. Inspections regime from 1993 until its termination in 2000. Timothy McCarthy, a senior analyst at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California. From 1994 to 1999, he also served with UNSCOM as deputy chief inspector for the missile team. And David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington. He's a former nuclear inspector under the auspices of the international atomic energy agency. Welcome, gentlemen.

We heard Colin Powell say that the old regime, David Albright, just didn't work. Today's agreement that was announced in Vienna, does that jump start the chance that inspections will resume soon?

DAVID ALBRIGHT: I don't think so. I mean, it's an easy test that Iraq passed today. I mean, it has to agree to much more, if the inspection process is going to work. And most importantly it's going to have to demonstrate that it's going to cooperate. I would have been much more encouraged if Iraq had said, fine, come into my presidential site, we don't need the Security Council to act, we're willing to move forward. But I think the Iraqis just did what they had to do, in order to keep in the game.

GWEN IFILL: By saying that, by not allowing access to the presidential sites, you think that was a sign of bad faith?

DAVID ALBRIGHT: I would have just been more encouraged if they had agreed to do it. They had a perfect opportunity to do it. So I don't have a lot of confidence that they've truly decided to cooperate.

GWEN IFILL: Charles Duelfer, what is your take on that?

CHARLES DUELFER: Well, I think David is right, there's some big issues here. One is I think a matter of terms cooperate is one thing, but comply is another. There's also a lot of discussion about immediate unconditional and unrestricted access. Iraq may permit access, but the question is: can the inspectors actually get an inspection which surprises them, in other words which gets to a location that the Iraqis are not anticipatory of, and then they can hide the materials. I think it was very interesting what General Amir Al Sadi said with respect to so-called sensitive sites where he said they would have taken the preparations to allow access. I think he was telling us more than he understood in that they will have a warning system and it will make the preparations in advance.

GWEN IFILL: Timothy McCarthy, tell us a little bit about what it takes to do this. When we talk about inspections we think we know what we mean, but this is kind of a complicated and lengthy process we're talking about, so it wouldn't just happen overnight, would it?

TIMOTHY McCARTHY: No, absolutely. I mean, you need to get the right people; you need to have the right information base, either information that you have available or from intelligence agencies, and so forth. You need site plans, and this takes a long time to do, and in particular it takes a long time to figure out from the data that you have, either made available from automatic or other information, your objectives -- and so I don't see an inspection being able to be carried off in the immediate sense, especially since Iraq just dumped a lot of data into the hands of inspectors. They need some time to absorb that data.

GWEN IFILL: Let's talk about that data. There were four CD ROMs handed over I gather which were part of information that was supposed to have been handed over but has not for the last several years. How much use, how useful could those CD ROMs be, do you think?

TIMOTHY McCARTHY: Well, it serves as a basis for your inspections, you have to start with something in hand to begin verifying what the Iraqis have said. What's actually most interesting about these CD ROMs is the fact that they were indeed available. I mean, this tells us that the national monitoring director which is in or has been the liaison always was the liaison between UNSCOM and the inspectors still exists, it's still working for some reason they were still requiring six-month declarations from the various sites that we visited. What that means is a little bit unclear to me. But perhaps they expected all along that inspectors would come back.

GWEN IFILL: Mr. Albright, do you think it's possible that the two-week time frame Hans Blix suggested today, that we can be in there in two weeks? October 15th is the date people have been tossing around, is that even doable?

DAVID ALBRIGHT: It's doable if the Security Council gets their resolution together and is able to give Blix and his team proper instructions. I think it's a very bad idea for Blix to go ahead under the old resolution from 1999 and go in.

GWEN IFILL: Was he getting the cart in front of the horse here?

DAVID ALBRIGHT: I think definitely. And I'm not sure why this meeting in Vienna took place; I'm glad it was successful, at least it didn't create additional problems, but I think the inspectors should really stand down and wait for instructions from the Security Council.

GWEN IFILL: So your take on this is anything that happened today won't really happen until the Security Council acts, as Secretary Powell and Ambassador Greenstock --

DAVID ALBRIGHT: It's very important for the Security Council to strengthen the inspection process. I deeply believe that inspections can work in Iraq, but only if they are strengthened and Iraq chooses to cooperate, and I will add, and comply. The ball is in finally is in Iraq's court and they have to demonstrate convincingly that they are going to comply. It can't be a repeat of the 90s, where there's a cat and mouse game, and the inspectors are forced to prove that Iraq is not complying. I mean Iraq has to prove it is complying. And I think that is going to require strong Security Council action, and a strong action by the inspectors to draw that compliance out of Iraq.

GWEN IFILL: Mr. Duelfer, let's talk about where we last left this. When inspectors last left Iraq, under whatever circumstances you choose to describe, where were things left and how do you pick up from where they left off now, or do you just start from scratch?

CHARLES DUELFER: Well, there's a little bit of two things going on here. Let me just clarify perhaps by saying that there are two fundamental tasks, which the inspectors have. One is to account for the weapons systems, which we know Iraq had. These are the weapons we knew they built, the anthrax, the chemical weapons, the long rake ballistic missiles. The second task they have is to monitor all of the infrastructure, the industry in Iraq to assure they don't reconstitute those programs. These are two major tasks. Now, on the monitoring side that requires a lot of ground work, spade work, this is what these CD ROMs were related to. The normal industrial infrastructure needs to be monitored. That's time consuming, but it was non-controversial, because these are sites that Iraq knew would be visited by inspectors. Where we had incomplete work, was in the weapons area that Iraq was meant to declare, but we could not verify that they had fully accounted for these things. There were big uncertainties in the biological area, in some chemical areas, and even in the long range ballistic missile area. So we left with some key uncertainties. It will be very interesting to see if the inspectors go back in if they are able to interview the individuals who worked on these programs and have them account for their time between the point when we left and when they go back in.

GWEN IFILL: Mr. McCarthy, in the time that has passed since the inspectors left, has technology improved to a degree that would actually make the job of conducting inspections any easier now?

TIMOTHY McCARTHY: Well, I mean, there's certainly technologies that have evolved as you noted, and I understand that the action team who I have a tremendous amount of faith in have developed some technologies over the four years. But we shouldn't get, you know, too involved in terms of thinking about technologies. This is really comes down to a question of people, and it's really experience and a kind of a nose to know what you're looking for, who to talk to -- to tell if, to understand if they're telling you the truth or not. And that requires a lot of experience. So technology is a way to help do you this job, but ultimately it comes down to the inspector on the ground doing the work, the spade work that Charlie Duelfer talked about.

GWEN IFILL: Then let me ask you another question based on that. How do you make something like this work had the inspectors are going into a completely hostile environment?

TIMOTHY McCARTHY: Well, I should say it's not necessarily a completely hostile environment. In some cases, like at the monitored sites, as Charlie mentioned, there were essentially non-controversial issues. The thing to do is to train people to the extent that you can, to get people on the teams that have been there more than one or two times. And that's really the route that UNMOVIC needs to go down. They've done the training, I'm not really sure if they have the numbers of people who have the time in Iraq that really again have this sort of nose to know what to look for above and beyond what they might read in a manual.

GWEN IFILL: Mr. Albright, how do you determine how long it will take before you begin to get the answers to these questions? We're not talking about sending inspectors in there and coming out in even two, three, four months with the answers, are we?

DAVID ALBRIGHT: You can, I mean it's very boat that a plan be put in place that can get an answer quickly about whether you anticipate cooperation from Iraq. And one test will be if a resolution passed that requires a new declaration, do you believe what you're reading? Inspectors have a lot of experience going through declarations, combining it with other information, and making a judgment of whether what they're reading is true or complete. So I think if Iraq is required to create a new declaration, that would particular in account for what's happened in the last four years, I think the inspectors can relatively rapidly make a decision. They can also insist on seeing certain key personnel and then be able to interview them, and again there's a lot of experience interviewing Iraqis. I think the only new aspect of this has to be that the minders are not with the Iraqis. I mean, if we're trying to get to the truth you want to use police techniques of interrogation where you can talk to people individually and then compare stories and see if there are inconsistencies.

GWEN IFILL: I want to ask each of you this. Do you believe that Iraq actually does possess weapons of mass destruction, whether they be biological, chemical, nuclear?

DAVID ALBRIGHT: I personally believe there's plenty of evidence for biological and chemical, and there's sufficient evidence to believe that there's a reconstituted nuclear weapons program. As an inspection attitude, I think you have to assume that they have more than what the evidence suggests, and that it's very important for inspectors to go in there with a very skeptical attitude and insist that the Iraqis prove them wrong.

GWEN IFILL: Same question to you, Mr. Duelfer.

CHARLES DUELFER: I think it's quite clear that they have these capabilities. The mistake that was made in 1991 when the original resolutions were drafted was that no one understood how vital these capabilities were seen to the regime. They're existential; the problem is there is no e equivalent carrot or stick which would cause Iraq to this date to give up those capabilities. Therefore the inspectors are really, they have a mismatch. They are asked to do something, asked to give up something it considers vital, but there's no equivalent threat or carrot to cause them to do so.

GWEN IFILL: Mr. McCarthy, your answer?

TIMOTHY McCARTHY: Yeah, I think when we left in at the end of 1998, Iraq had retained its capabilities, and I think there's enough sufficient level of quality information that tells us that they continue to expand these capabilities since the time that we left.

GWEN IFILL: And do you believe that the actions today taken in Vienna will help you to get to the bottom of that?

TIMOTHY McCARTHY: Well, I think it will help. To say the least these inspectors are going have a very difficult task. This is going to be a tough job, they're going to have to go back and deal with all these open weapons questions at the same time try to set up this monitoring system, so they're in for a tough task over the coming month.

GWEN IFILL: Mr. McCarthy, Mr. Duelfer, Mr. Albright, thank you very much for joining us.

RAY SUAREZ: Still to come on the NewsHour tonight, the troubles in America's West Coast ports, and looking at AIDS as a security threat.

ENCORE ON THE WATERFRONT

RAY SUAREZ: It was day three today of the labor dispute that's shuttered 29 of the nation's major West Coast ports. Shipping lines say they are keeping the ports closed and workers locked off the job until unions agree to a contract extension. Spencer Michels explains what's at stake for both sides in a report we first aired in September.

SPENCER MICHELS: 60% of the nation's cargo-- $300 billion worth-- annually pass through West Coast ports; everything from food products and electronics to autos. One study said total business revenue generated by the ports is 7% of America's Gross Domestic Product. The stakes for the union and the companies are also enormous. Richard Mead is president of Local 10, and he says the power of the union to control shipping-related jobs is what the shippers want to erode.

RICHARD MEAD, President, ILWU Local 10: They want power on the waterfront. They want to be able to grab a hold of the ILWU, Put a ring through our nose, and just lead us around.

SPENCER MICHELS: "Not so," says Joe Miniace, president of the PacificMaritime Association, which represents the shipping companies. He says the unions have consistently resisted the introduction of technology that would lessen the number of jobs.

JOE MINIACE, President, Pacific Maritime Assoc.: The overriding issue is technology; it's modernization of the ports and technology is a tool to modernize ports.

SPENCER MICHELS: Union power, technology and the economy are issues they've been battling over at West Coast ports for decades. In 1934, longshoremen struck at San Francisco and other western ports to establish a union hiring hall and to strengthen their fledgling union. Six people died in clashes with the police, and all union workers in San Francisco declared a general strike before the fight ended. Because of his strike role, Harry Bridges, an Australian- born dock worker, became a leading union figure. The U.S. tried unsuccessfully four times to deport him as a communist. Bridges established the ILWU, and over the years negotiated contracts that brought good wages and protected jobs, even in the face of new technology that threatened those jobs.

RICHARD MEAD: Harry Bridges saw technology for what it was. He came down and explained to us... he said, "fellows, you can't fight technology. It's coming." He says, "so you got to bring it in, and when you bring it in, you get what you can for it."

SPENCER MICHELS: In fact, union members earn $60,000 to $114,000 or more a year, depending on how much they work. High wages and good benefits were a kind of payoff for the union acquiescing to technology that came in the '60s and reduced employment on the docks. Bulk cargo, which required a lot of workers to load and offload, was replaced by containers: Big metal boxes that were transported by trucks or rail, loaded onto ships and then offloaded. Fewer workers were needed. Ports like San Francisco that didn't modernize essentially died. And at up-to-date ports like Oakland and Los Angeles, some Longshore workers became marine clerks, keeping track by hand and by computer of the contents and the movement of the containers. Wherever that work was-- at the dock or where the containers were packed-- the union claimed it had jurisdiction. But just how far that jurisdiction goes is still in dispute. Jim Spinosa is president of the ILWU.

JIM SPINOSA: What the employers want is to continue to advance technology, and we embrace that. And that any new work that would be created through technology would then we'd have an opportunity to do that work. The employers are saying no to that, and that's where the big hurdle is.

SPENCER MICHELS: Now, more computerization and automation is imminent, and some of the work would be done far from the docks. Labor wants those jobs to be union. Immediately, 400 union jobs are at stake. But according to the shipping companies, the future of West Coast ports is at stake as well. The Pacific Maritime Association sponsored a study that found West Coast ports were inefficient compared to many foreign ports in speed and efficiency.

JOSEPH MINIACE: Our facilities today, as we compete in a world market, are probably at best four times behind the European and Asian terminals-- at best. But the shippers are going to get to the point where it's so expensive to ship to our ports they will find alternatives. The biggest worry I have is that possible competitor that's not even here yet, and that's Mexico.

SPENCER MICHELS: The consultants projected that in the global economy, West Coast cargo will double in ten years and then double again. Peter Vandermat is an engineer with the consulting firm JDW.

PETER VANDERMAT: That means that per acre, you know, of port, you're going to need to handle two times, three times, four times as many containers. Just tracking them, moving them, you know, efficiently and effectively, it's going to become, you know, a tremendous management challenge.

SPENCER MICHELS: Vandermat's firm recommends several automated systems to speed things up. For example, a major bottleneck is the gate, where trucks arrive with containers and drivers have to talk with clerks via intercom. Technology already exists, the consultants say, to smooth the flow, according to Tom Ward.

TOM WARD, JDW Group: As the truck drives through that portal, these cameras and a dynamic scale collect all of the information on that truck. They inspect it, they collect the numbers off of it, they read its identification tag, they weigh it, they take pictures of it for posterity and for insurance records.

SPENCER MICHELS: If union members accept such technology, they want to run it, but they are convinced employers have other plans.

RICHARD MEAD: What the employers are saying now is, "we want technology, and whatever new jobs are created out of technology are going to be non-union jobs." And that's where the threat is.

SPENCER MICHELS: Employers contend the union wants to duplicate work already done by shippers elsewhere and transmitted over the Internet.

JOSEPH MINIACE: The union is saying, "if it's on the Internet, that we should be doing that work. And you're outsourcing it to somebody else." Whoever did it, and these are their words, "whether it be in Japan, Chicago or Sacramento, it has to be redone here. That's our work."

SPENCER MICHELS: While an agreement has been reached on a new benefits package, both sides foresee major economic loses to their members if they lose the battle over technology. But they may not be in that fight alone, because the stakes are so high at a time when the economy already is weak. Economist Stephen Cohen of the University of California looked at the potential impacts of a dock strike, and found them enormous. For example, he says, the U.S. Businesses are dependent on just-in-time delivery of supplies, and a port strike would completely disrupt that.

STEPHEN COHEN: Companies no longer have big warehouses stuffed with two weeks', three weeks' worth of spare parts and merchandise, so factories are running lean, just in time, which looks to be vulnerable.

SPENCER MICHELS: And Cohen sees an impact beyond American industry.

STEPHEN COHEN: The collateral damage could start with currency markets. If you were a trader in London, you've heard the docks are closing, that is not good news to, say, the Thai economy, the Taiwanese economy, the Indonesian economy, many of which are struggling. "Dump," then look.

SPENCER MICHELS: Such dire predictions coming in the midst of America's war on terrorism have raised concerns in the Bush administration, and fears from labor of government intervention. It's an intervention companies would welcome.

JOSEPH MINIACE: It behooves the administration, whether it be Bush or Clinton, to oversee these operations. There's four million jobs tied to these ports. And if there's any disruption on these ports, we could have an economic disaster.

SPENCER MICHELS: Labor has rallied against what it says are indications from the bush administration it might intervene. The union claims cabinet-level officials told them the government was prepared to prevent a strike. Officials could invoke the Taft-Hartley Act, forcing workers to stay on the job for 80 days.Unionists also say the government is considering replacing union workers with the military in the name of protecting the economy in time of war. Publicly, administration spokesmen deny such plans, and say they are just watching the situation carefully.

RAY SUAREZ: Today neither side showed signs of ending the lockout. It's estimated that a 10-day shutdown could cost the U.S. economy as much as $20 billion.

FOCUS SECURITY THREAT

RAY SUAREZ: Finally tonight, AIDS and international security.

A new report from the CIA highlights five "major regional or global players," countries where surging rates of HIV and AIDS could affect political and economic stability. The next wave of AIDS, according to the report, will affect China, the world's most populous country of 1.3 billion people. The CIA report highlighted its importance to the regional economy of East Asia -- India, where the population of one billion will soon surpass that of china. The Indian AIDS numbers are projected to be the worst in the world: 25 million patients by 2010. Russia's numbers will be significantly lower, but the intelligence agency worries the epidemic could hurt Russia's transition out of the Soviet era. Nigeria is a major oil source and home to 130 million. Africa's most populous country has been a frequent contributor to regional peacekeeping in places like Sierra Leone and Liberia. The CIA also cited Ethiopia in East Africa. The agency worries that a growing AIDS crisis make ethnic and regional tensions worse in a country adjacent to Eritrea, Somalia, and the Sudan. In all those countries, the report says, cumulative AIDS cases will triple over the next decade from an estimated 23 million today to as many as 75 million by 2010. By then, prevalence of the disease will eclipse that of Central and Southern Africa. The CIA report notes that while the next stage countries are in early- to mid-stages of the epidemic, HIV/AIDS has not been made a sustained high priority. What's more, the five countries have weak health care systems to combat the disease. The report follows a similar warning two years ago, when the Clinton administration first called the global epidemic a national security threat, adding AIDS to a list that includes terrorism and nuclear weapons.

RAY SUAREZ: For more on the report we're joined by Nicholas Eberstadt, a researcher with the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington-based think tank; he was an independent reviewer of the CIA Report. And Princeton Lyman, the executive director of the Global Interdependence Initiative at the Aspen Institute, a research and policy organization.

Nicholas Eberstadt, if we start taking the focus away from Sub-Saharan Africa, small countries with very high rates of infection, and start looking at these super size of countries, some of them nuclear powers, how does that change the discussion of AIDS and security?

NICHOLAS EBERSTADT: Well, so far in Sub-Saharan Africa we've had a catastrophe of world historical proportion. It's been treated as a tragedy, but mainly a humanitarian tragedy. And that's because Sub-Saharan Africa has been essentially marginal to the international economy and the international balance of power. Eurasia is not marginal to either of those things. It's the center with the majority of the world's population, and with a growing fraction of the world's economic output. The HIV epidemic as it expands and goes through Eurasia will be taken en much more seriously by so-called real politicians.

RAY SUAREZ: Princeton Lyman, are you okay with this definition of AIDS as an international security threat, or should we keep the emphasis on public health, humanitarian aid?

PRINCETON LYMAN: I think the dimensions of this disease rate it as a potential security threat, because it attacks the military and therefore undermines the capacity of countries and their ability to engage either in peacekeeping or their own defense. It undermines stability where people compete for resources. It undermines the economy. And in areas as Nicholas has said of strategic importance to the United States, this becomes a serious issue.

RAY SUAREZ: Is there something more than a difference in scale that we're talking about -- when we look away from a place like Botswana that has roughly the same number of people as Brooklyn, to a place like China, with over a billion people?

PRINCETON LYMAN: Well, scale matters, because just with the low prevalence rate as the report points outs, you're talking about millions of people. But also, take China, for example. We know from the way AIDS has to be addressed that you really need to engage society, it becomes very quickly a human rights issue. Is China going to be able to engage civic society, allow for people to organize and mobilize? If it doesn't, you won't be able to deal with this issue, but it could become a serious internal political issue.

RAY SUAREZ: And in a place like Russia, Nick Eberstadt, where you're talking about so far prevalence among intravenous drug users, but the possibility of the disease moving into the general population, you've written an awful lot about Russia and public health in the last couple years.

NICHOLAS EBERSTADT: Russia has a very unlovely feature of this HIV problem, which is their prison population. Russia has about one million convicts in jail at any given moment. There is virtually no public health infrastructure in the jails. The prisons have become sort of an incubation ground for drug resistant TB and HIV and unlike the good old days of Stalin, people are let out of jail in Russia now, they go back to the places from which they came. You have a virtual carburetor system pumping HIV and drug resistant TB around the country.

RAY SUAREZ: And an already health compromised general population?

NICHOLAS EBERSTADT: Absolutely, absolutely. Russia is already undergoing a health crisis. I think that every several years Russia loses world war one's worth of males to excess mortality. And this is an additional factor in that delicate situation.

RAY SUAREZ: Even if all these countries involved, Princeton Lyman, were going to start today putting in new education methods putting in new public awareness methods, would we see the numbers still peak as sort of those who are already ill or about to be ill have to sort of move through the stages of HIV and AIDS?

PRINCETON LYMAN: Well, I think if governments really mobilized, and some governments have, and really went all out, they could hold down these projections. They couldn't stop them entirely, but they could hold them down, but it takes a tremendous am of mobilization. Take the country of Senegal. Senegal has held the projection down from the beginning, but it mobilized all elements of society, mobilized the military, the religious leaders. They set standards; they had discipline in the military. And they use their religious leaders. Uganda also mobilized everyone. But if you don't do that, if these countries can't do that or won't do it, they're going to have a very hard time controlling this.

RAY SUAREZ: Well, wasn't China even reluctant to admit it had an AIDS problem?

PRINCETON LYMAN: Only quite recently within a year did China admit that they had a serious problem, that they had about a million people infected, some people rate it much higher -- and they have come to the United States to ask for assistance. But they're a long way from developing the kind of national program that they need to really get at this problem.

NICHOLAS EBERSTADT: And there are still parts of the Chinese problem and the Chinese government is arresting people and detaining people even for talking about, such as their tainted blood problem, and the reason for that is that the government fears that they will be blamed for this particular problem, having been arguably complicit in its development.

RAY SUAREZ: You know, these countries are very different from each other, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, China, India, but are there some things they have no common -- social upheaval in the recent past, heading to the cities, lots of new mobility that makes AIDS more of a near term problem?

NICHOLAS EBERSTADT: I suppose you can say that. I'm struck by the difference in the particular epidemiologies in the different countries. I'm struck by the prison problem in Russia, by the blood aspect in China, which is only part of it, by the trucker routes in India. IV drug use does not seem to be so much a part of the Ethiopian or the Nigerian problem, but very much the problem for the Eurasian countries. There are differences I think one can appreciate.

RAY SUAREZ: Are there models for having the future be otherwise from the fairly grim projection made by the CIA Report?

PRINCETON LYMAN: There are models. Thailand has also controlled the level of infection. Again reaching out to all elements of society, dealing with prostitutes, dealing with religion, et cetera; they've been relatively successful. Botswana now has a very comprehensive program it should have started much earlier. Brazil has also kept the rate under control -- with again a comprehensive program of testing, of treatment of outreach, et cetera. So, yes, there are models out there, but it takes a lot of work and it takes resources.

RAY SUAREZ: And given what you know about these countries, are you optimistic that anybody will grab the nettles?

PRINCETON LYMAN: I would give India the highest possibility. I don't know about you, Nicholas.

NICHOLAS EBERSTADT: I think that's a very reasonable assessment. Even if you look at a success story like Thailand, you have to keep in mind that between the onset of the really pro-active policies around 1990 and now, there's been more than a doubling of the number of HIV carriers -- of the HIV population, which is because there's a stock of people, but there's also an inflow of new patients, new victims. It's very hard for me to imagine at this moment China replicating the successful aspects of the Thailand program, active civil society, NGO's going everywhere, fairly good trust in the government. I don't see those components in a place like China.

RAY SUAREZ: Keeping in mind that this is a human tragedy of mind bending size, is there also some worry that when you've got countries that are like Ethiopia surrounded by already unstable countries, that losing a big slice of your men suddenly creates danger, instability -- Nigeria, a place that will been trying to keep the peace in its neck of Africa, suddenly undone by this kind of thing

PRINCETON LYMAN: Oh, there's a lot of speculation and some good research on the correlations between this kind of dissolution of society if you want to call it and instability. Take the question of orphans: The projection in Africa of 40 million orphans by 2010 now we know that children are incorporated as child soldiers into rebel groups; they become sources of instability, communities break down. The potential for instability from this and the breakdown of social life and the ability to contain and maintain normal lives can be very disabling. There's one more issue if I can

RAY SUAREZ: Quickly.

PRINCETON LYMAN: Quickly. The cost, if we are facing 75 or $100 million or just 75 million people infected, even if you keep the cost at $500 a year, which is difficult, you're talking about a treatment bill of over $30 billion. That's going to be an international issue.

RAY SUAREZ: Suarez: Princeton Lyman, Nicholas Eberstadt, thank you both.

RECAP

RAY SUAREZ: Again the major developments of the day: UN and Iraqi officials agreed on a plan to renew weapons inspections. Late today Secretary of State Colin Powell said inspectors should not return to Iraq until the UN Security Council passes a tough new resolution. And President Bush rejected a compromise congressional resolution on Iraq. We'll see you online, and again here tomorrow evening. I'm Ray Suarez. Thanks and good night.